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ON BOOKNAPPING AND OTHER HEADACHES 
Alfredda Scobey 
you remember the lovely old book.mark with the legend: 
Steal not this book for fear of shame, 
For it is in the owner's name 
And when you're dead the Lord will say 
Where is that book you stole away? 
It seems that in today's world, we have to rely less 
on the suspect's fear of questioning by the Lord and more on 
the inculcation of a proper respect for questioning by our 
law enforcement people and--let's face it--by ourselves. The 
sad truth. is that if we do not do it ourselves, it will not 
be done. The sage was right who said: "An alert and ded-
icated staff is the most effective defense a library can have." 
You have asked me to come here with some suggestions 
on detection and deterrence. This puts me, as we say, be-
tween a rock and a hard place. You all know about physical 
security of archives and libraries than I do, as Mr. Berkeley's 
magnificent presentation well proves. Yet if I confine myself 
to talking about law, I wil l be like the child who, when his 
father asked what the teacher had said, replied, ''More than I 
wanted to know." 
After weighing these hazards, I have decided to talk 
about archives and library security in terms of circumstan-
tial evidence. This type of evidence takes up considerable 
time and thought on the part of lawyers. One of our early 
great judges, Justice Bleckley, pointed out that often among 
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the facts most clearly established in a case are those to 
which no witness had ever testified. 
I will give you an example of circumstantial evi-
dence. A rather scroungy little man walked into Tiffany's 
in New York some years back and asked to look at diamond 
rings. The clerk took a tray of rings out of the showcase 
and laid it on top of the glass counter. After examining 
them carefully, the customer asked to see something better. 
The clerk replaced the tray and got out another one. That 
in turn was rejected and replaced. Eventually the clerk 
brought out a tray from the interior of a vault with each 
exquisite ring sparkling in its _ own_ place. After the cus-
tomer had examined them all under the eagle eye of the staff, 
he turned to leave without making a purchase. As he reached 
the door, he stumbled and fell, and out of his pockets rolled 
two- or three-dozen glittering cut stones. You can imagine 
what happened: somebody locked the door, somebody called 
the police, and three or four stout men held the suspect 
down. Unfortunately, the brilliants were from Woolworths, 
and were poor quality at that. And the purported customer 
turned out to be none other than Groucho Marx, who had pulled 
the hoax in order to win a bet. 
Did Groucho Marx have a false arrest suit against 
anybody? Certainly everybody in that store had what the 
lawbooks call "probable cause" to think him a thief, which 
is really what I am here to talk to you about. Probable 
cause, in the context of theft, is simply that totality of 
circumstances which would make a reasonable man believe that 
a particular human being has possessed himself of a particu-
lar piece of property belonging to somebody else, and that 
his purpose in doing so is to make off with it without the 
owner's consent. Now, all sorts of things can lead you to 
such a conclusion, from a wild hunch to actually seeing the 
person stick the item under his coat, and the question you 
always have to ask yourself when you reach this conclusion 
is whether that fictional masterpiece and darling of the 
law~the hypothetical man of ordinary prudence and discre-
tion--would reach the same conclusion you have. If he would, 
or if a jury would think he would under the circumstances, 
then you have probable cause. Otherwise you do not. Simple, 
isn't it? 
The fact of the matter is, however, that if custo-
dians of books and records and artifacts err, it is usually 
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on the side of conservatism. I have never heard of a false 
arrest action being brought against a librarian, and am sure 
that none has been in Georgia. The Archivist of the United 
States has pointed out that archivists are a trained and ded· 
icated group with a strong public service orientation. He 
adds: 
I wonder if we are sometimes prone to forget 
that not all those with whom we come in contact 
have equally high standards of probity and honesty 
• . • • [We need to] devote at least a little time 
to the fact that documents are sometimes stolen, to 
the ways in which thieves operate, and to a study 
of deterrents against theft. We must teach our 
archivists to be suspicious and watchful without 
diminishing in any respect their obligation to be 
courteous and helpful to researchers.! 
It seems to me that this is putting a great burden 
on you to be two kinds of people at the same time, as though 
you were expected to be both a doctor and a detective. But 
it is true that even with police officers and security men 
around, it is ultimately the staff who prevents or detects 
documentary theft. 
There is such a thing as a professional thief of 
valuable documents. It is your job to educate him into the 
realization that there are other avenues of trade more re-
munerative for him, and that he has made a tragic error in 
his choice of career. To do this you must on occasion be 
alert and willing to act on the evidence before you. 
What is required in the way of surveillance depends 
less on the class of people using the facilities than on the 
value of the holdings. Even sedate and elegant institutions 
patronized in the main by serious researchers become vul-
nerable as they accumulate rare items which attract the 
attention of a professional documents or museum thief, or 
the value of which proves tempting to someone who heretofore 
has proved to be a trustworthy employee. I might say that 
my reading in the area suggests that in a truly great per-
centage of the important heists an ·employee is implicated, 
either acting alone or working in concert with a profes-
sional specialist in this type of theft. This is outside 
the purpose of my discussion today, except to point out 
that it exists and that the security measures to combat it 
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are of a different and specialized character. 
In document theft, the same circumstances operate 
as in shoplifting. I recently heard a talk by the head of 
security at Rich's department store, who said that not only 
is inventory loss by theft now accelerating astronomically, 
so that it equals between 1 and 2 percent of sales, but 
samplings of recovered goods suggest that a majority were 
stolen by or in connivance with an employee working in the 
store. This is a horrifying state of affairs, but it is one 
of the facts of life in today's business world. Neverthe-
less, stores are frequent targets of false arrest suits, which 
may be even more costly. Therefore, the motto of these secu-
rity people, and I also advise it for those on your staffs 
stationed in reading rooms, is ''IF YOU DIDN'T SEE IT, IT 
DIDN'T HAPPEN." 
Institutions such as the Atlanta Public Library 
sustain their losses primarily piecemeal and as a result 
of customer theft. This means that the usual theft will 
not reach felony proportions. In Georgia there are no such 
things as common law crimes. Only what is declared illegal 
by statute can be the subject of police action. The statute 
determines whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor, 
because he.re by definition any crime punishable by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary for over one year is a felony. All 
other offenses are misdemeanors. The maximum penalty for a 
misdemeanor is a year in jail and a $1,000 fine. A theft 
of goods, the value of which totals less than $100, is de-
clared to be a misdemeanor; over $100, it is a felony. 
This has important consequences. A citizen's arrest can 
be made only when the person actually sees the crime being 
committed in his presence, unless the crime is a felony and 
the perpetrator is escaping and the person has probable cause 
to believe this man actually committed the crime. 
You may be surprised to learn that, so far as I can 
find out, no actual arrests are made by the Atlanta Public 
Library, although it employs a detective and a security 
officer and also makes use of Checkpoint, one of the better 
electronic surveillance meth0ds. All books are electrically 
coded, and there is a very efficient turnstyle system that 
forces traffic to flow out through a narrow passage where 
books are checked out by deactivating an electronic signal 
which has been placed in them. If the signal is not de-
activated, the turnstyle locks and the customer is unable 
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to exit. At that point, the customer is politely reminded 
by the attendant at the desk that he should produce his book 
to be checked, or he is asked to open his briefcase, or what-
ever, to determine the cause for the alarm. If the customer 
refuses point blank, however, the staff employee at the desk 
must release the turnstyle lock and allow his departure. In 
the end, the system has only a psychological value. And it is 
expensive. I do not know what Atlanta pays, but such a sys-
tem normally costs $2,500 or more per year for rental, plus 
15¢ to 30¢ per book for the tape, plus a tremendous amount 
of staff time to place the coded material in each book. 
Furthermore, it is far from accurate. The system picks up 
any metal, and a metal briefcase, or a can of hair spray in 
a pocketbook, will set it off. Also it can be fooled. If 
the book is carried under one's pants belt with a coat over 
it, or under one's coat with an arm over it, there will be 
no signal. In spite of all this, the Atlanta Library feels 
the system worthwhile, which gives some indication of the 
volume of book thefts. When a large system like the Atlanta 
Library simply throws up its hands insofar as invoking the 
law, it becomes clear what every depository of books and 
papers is up against. After making some study of the laws 
on the books, I have become convinced that we do in fact need 
legislation which will allow archivists and librarians some 
practical access to the law as a deterrent to theft. 
First, let me point out that there are separate 
categories of thieves and that it would be rewarding to con-
sider briefly the kind of people you may come up against. At 
one end of the spectrum is t he absent minded professor who 
unintentionally gets a manuscript mixed up with his own pa-
pers and starts out with it . There is the busy researcher 
who is technically guilty. He has to leave and decides it 
would be much easier for him to finish his reading in the 
privacy of his own home before sneaking the copy back in. 
There is the very occasional scholar who has become so en-
amored of his own field, and developed such a sentimental 
attachment to his area, that the temptation of personally 
possessing some document or artifact is irresistible. There 
i s the true pathological kleptomaniac. There is the amateur 
beset by sudden temptation, and there is the professional who 
works through a fence or even sometimes on colll11lission from 
an unscrupulous dealer or collector. He is, of course, the 
most dangerous, and you are not likely to catch him in the 
act. He will have given false references, if you demand 
references, and one of the best safeguards you can have is 
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to make at least spotchecks to be absolutely certain that 
users unknown to you personally have the proper credentials. 
If the price is worth it, he may go to great lengths to 
establish himself as a bona fide scholar. There are also, 
as recent events have shown, both the mentally unstable and 
the political protester, such as the group of women revolu-
tionaries who bombed the Harvard Library in 1970. There 
also have been instances of destruction of catalogues . 
Facing these hazards and a stunning increase in pos-
sessory crimes in the past few years, archivists confront 
two questions. One is how best to keep people, either in-
advertently or with intent, from removing property without 
consent from repositories. The other is how far it is 
prudent to go in ambiguous circumstances without subjecting 
yourselves or your employer to charges of false arrest or 
false imprisonment. There are, in the present state of the 
law, stringent safeguards which a suspect may invoke, and I 
believe it might be helpful to go into the reasons for them 
so that you can better understand the issues as they are 
sometimes seen by trial judges. This also will give my 
reasons for certain changes I would recommend in the law. 
In general, a suspect's defenses are constitutional 
in nature, usually predicated on the Fourth amendment in 
the Bill of Rights, enacted in 1791 and described as one 
of the most litigated provisions in the Constitution. It 
provides that every man shall be safe in his person, papers 
and effects, and that no search is legal except on oath 
specially designating the person or place to be searched 
and on a showing of probable cause. The Supreme Court re-
cently stated that probable cause (to believe a crime has 
been committed) is not a technical concept, but is based on 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 
which reasonable and prudent men act (Adams, 407 U.S.). It 
applies to arrests, detentions, and searches. Searches with-
out search warrants are always illegal, except in certain 
instances or by virtue of certain legislation which I will 
mention shortly. Somebody who knows sufficient facts to 
constitute probable cause must swear to those facts before 
a judge or magistrate, and if the magistrate agrees, he may 
issue a warrant. This warrant is served only by a peace 
officer and only on the person or the property which it de-
scribes. That forbids you from making any search ever of 
a person you think is concealing stolen goods on his per-
son, or among his effects, unless you come under an exception. 
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Not only that, it eliminates your calling any policeman to 
search the suspect under any circumstances, unless you are 
very sure you can prove the value of the object is over $100. 
Remember that a policeman cannot arrest and search without 
a warrant if the theft is a misdemeanor, rather than a felony, 
unless he personally has seen the of fender take the item. 
What you tell him may amount to probable cause to believe 
the suspect is in possession of the material, but the officer 
can arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant only if the 
misdemeanor is cotmnitted in his presence. Hence, in Georgia 
the idea of holding a suspect by watching or talking to him 
until you can get a policeman may not necessarily work, even 
if the officer arrives immediately and even if he believes 
you, unless you convince him also that the value of the 
material reaches felony proportions. This explains why the 
Atlanta Public Library makes no arrests. 
Lest .warrants appear more impediment than support 
of law, they are in fact absolutely vital to our existence 
as a free people. It has been recognized since the days of 
the Magna· Carta that the power of government to take a citizen's 
person or property, unless it was lawfully undertaken and un-
less a written record showed it to be lawful, was slavery. 
By the eighteenth century this was well established; however, 
another practice had grown up of issuing what were called 
"general warrants." While they showed that a crime had been 
cotmnitted, and authorized a search, they did not specify who 
could do the searching or who could be searched. Henc~, 
anybody could use them on anybody. General warrants became 
the same as no warrant at all. This went on until 1763 when 
the British Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, felt it necessary 
to suppress an underground periodical called the North Briton. 
He issued som~ of these warrants, and among the houses searched 
on the strength of them was that of a member of Parliament, 
John Wilkes. Nothing was found. Wilkes brought a damage suit 
against Lord Halifax based on the proposition that general 
warrants were void and that Halifax was no better than a 
criminal in having his, Wilkes', house ransacked under these 
circumstances. Amazingly, Wilkes won the case, and a jury 
gave him61,000, or about $24,000 in today's money. He then 
brought suit for false imprisonment based on the same trans-
action and was awarded close to $100,000. American history 
buffs will remember the incendiary effect this had on Ameri-
cans complaining of some similar British practices in the 
colonies. 
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With your permission I will skip the next 200 years 
and get to the present state of repair of the edifice raised 
on those ancient and honorable foundations. Since World War 
II, expanding social consciousness on the one hand and in 
creased problems resulting from criminal activity on the 
other have given rise not so much to changes in the structure 
of the law as to a complicated architecture of U.S. Supreme 
Court opinions attempti ng to delimit the rights and duties 
of peace officers. The affects directly concern archivists 
in institutions large enough to have security guards or 
detectives equipped with police powers on call, and knowledge 
of the opinions is a prelude to an understanding of the rights 
and responsibilities of every archivist and librarian. 
In 1968, just 200 years after the British Wilkes 
case, the U. S. Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 
1). A plainclothesman in Cleveland, Ohio, had .noticed three 
men acting strangely. He watched them for a lengthy period. 
One man would walk down the street, look in a store window, 
move away, look in again, and then go back and talk to the 
other two. A second man would repeat the performance, and 
so on. The officer decided the men were casing the store 
preparatory to a hold up. Note that he had no "probable 
cause" for this conclusion, but he did have an "informed 
suspicion." He went up to them to investigate. Their 
answers were unsatisfactory; he quickly "frisked" one of 
them, Terry, by patting his outer clothing, felt a hard ob-
ject, reached in and drew out a revolver. He was then in a 
position to arrest Terry for carrying a concealed weapon--
that is, for a misdemeanor being conunitted in his presence. 
One of the predicates of a lawful arrest is that the suspect 
may then be fully searched, as well as taken down to the 
stati on house, booked, and interrogated at length. Terry 
eventually was convicted of possession of a concealed weapon 
and contended that the conviction should be set aside because 
he had been unlawfully arrested and searched. This led the 
court to face the hard realities of life, and to acknowledge 
that a "stop" is a sort of seizure, and a "frisk" is a sort 
of search. But it reached the conclusion that "stop and 
frisk," within limits, could be performed on less probable 
cause than "search and seizure." The ultimate conclusion of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio was that when a po-
l ice officer (and please note here that I am still talking 
about policemen and not ordinary citizens like you and me) 
"observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to con-
clude in the light of his experience that criminal activity 
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may be afoot," and while these facts do not amount to prob-
able cause to believe a felony is being committed in his 
presence, they yet serve as a justification to pursue the 
matter by further investigation. This usually means going 
up to the suspect and talking to him. If his suspicions are 
not allayed, and if the initial stop was reasonable under the 
circumstances, and if for some good reason he feels appre-
hensive (he suspects a crime of violence has been committed, 
or that the man may be armed and dangerous), he may then 
"frisk" the suspect--that is, give him a pat-down to ascertain 
whether he has weapons. This is only a weapons search and not 
a search for a packet of marijuana or a missing manuscript. 
But if such an item is found in the course of the weapons 
search, the suspect may be arrested rather than "detained," 
searched rather than "frisked," and conducted unceremoniously 
to the station house. 
Much case law has been made since Terry, including 
a 1972 decision which allowed a police officer to interrogate 
a man sitting in a car on a tip that he had heroin and a gun 
under his· belt, to reach under the belt, on finding the gun 
to arrest him for weapons possession, and then to search him 
and the vehicle for the narcotics. This is a lot closer to 
your situation, because here the officer is acting on informa-
tion from another person and not on what he sees himself. It 
is an indication that the court may broaden its position to 
justify a limited detention and search for less than probable 
cause, and for something the officer did not see but which was 
told to him by. somebody else. It is doubtful that such a rule 
ever will be applied generally, and in my opinion it would be 
exceedingly dangerous to every citizen, including good guys 
like you and me. But the case does suggest that there can be 
circumstances in which a police officer can act on informa-
tion furnished him by another person, in addition to that 
which reaches him from his informed senses. The rule there-
fore could be made the basis of legislation which would allow 
a peace officer to detain, and if necessary search, a per-
son whom the informant--a reading room attendant, for example 
--has actually seen attempt to steal archival, library or 
museum property. The same legislation could protect that 
informant if he told the truth and if what he observed in 
fact amounts to probable cause. 
By the way, the word "arrest" itself can be con-
fusing. We rightly think of it as the process by which a 
suspect is orally charged with a specific crime and taken to 
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the police station. In addition, we now have two other meanings 
to consider. In the "stop and frisk" context, the person is . 
accosted by a police officer involuntarily for purposes of 
investigation. If he is not free to walk away, this investigatory 
stage is not an "arrest" in the usual lay sense of the word, 
but legally it is. Even the Supreme Court calls it instead a 
"momentary detention" (and words of that sort), while admitting 
that it is sheer torture of the English language to pretend it 
is not a "seizure" of the person, just as an arrest is. But in 
the law of false arrest, the slightest touching or detaining of 
a person against his will is an arrest, and if not lawful, con-
sensual or privileged, it can be the basis of a damage suit. 
I feel that you need more protection in cases where 
you really have cause to believe that someone is making off 
with the archival or library property. The legislation I would 
propose addresses three questions: Can we broaden the area 
where the detention (and if necessary the search) of such a 
person is lawful? Can we broaden the area of consent? And 
can we broaden the area of privilege? 
Of course the situation you confront is much more 
subtle than that of the detective in a high crime area who be-
lieves he recognizes an escaped felon, or who sees conduct that 
suggests a suspect is casing a store preparatory to breaking 
in or is selling narcotics. What probably happens is that you 
the archivist suddenly realize something has disappeared and 
a visitor could have taken it, or that a visitor has closed 
his briefcase on what could be a valuable document or reference 
book, or even that you think you saw him slip something sur-
reptitiously under his coat. Even if you are fairly sure 
there is a thief in your presence and that he has the material 
in his possession, you can hardly hold him against his will, 
certainly not if his possessory crime is only a misdemeanor, 
which it would be if the value of the manuscript, or what-
ever, is less than $100. Of course you have the right politely 
to question him. It is when you seek to detain him against 
his will that you are in trouble. If the material has been 
charged out to him, he is responsible for it. But if he denies 
knowledge and refuses to open his coat or his briefcase, and 
the material in fact appears to be missing, what do you do? 
We need legislation to broaden the area of detention 
and search. I suggest that detention and search never be at-
tempted by a custodian of materials. Assuming that you have 
a detective or security guard with police power on the pre-
mises, or can get a policeman there quickly, you must remember 
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that even if you saw the suspect pocketing the material, the 
policeman only has your word for that fact. Further, he only 
has your word for the fact that the material is worth over 
$100 and therefore is of felony proportions. Hence the police-
man him.self would be doing an illegal act if he arrested with-
out a warrant for a crime not committed in his presence, 
especially if that crime might be only a misdemeanor. To 
shore up his power, for your protection, I suggest a clause 
found in some of the shoplifting statutes. It reads: 
A peace officer may, upon a charge being made 
and without a warrant, arrest any person whom he 
has reasonable cause to believe has committed or 
attempted to commit theft of or intentional dam.age 
to Depository property. 
If you have seen a theft, or seen things which, 
although they are circumstantial evidence, convince you that 
the visitor is committing a theft, your relation of these 
facts to the officer gives him the probable cause required 
by the statute. It places you more or less in the position 
of an informant, and the 1973 Allen case I mentioned which 
allowed a limited detention based on an informant's tip, 
indicates that such legislation would be Constitutional as 
a r-easonabLe search or seizure. The Supreme Court has 
emphasized on several occasions that it is only the unt>ea-
sonab Le search which is prohibited. The presumption that 
any search without a warrant is unreasonable is w~at needs 
to be removed in the situation we are talking about. 
The second piece of legislation I propose shores 
up your position and gives you a qualified privilege to act 
where you otherwise could not. It protects you for what you 
do within its parameters, and it also protects you where you· 
call a policeman and the policeman, acting on what you have 
told him, makes an arrest. The purpose of such legislation 
is to give you immunity from a false arrest or false im.prison-
~nt suit or malicious prosecution where you have probable 
cause to believe that the suspect has removed the material 
and is intending to steal it. The wording can be taken 
substantially from the paragraph of Mr. Berkeley's Virginia 
legislation headed "Exemption from liability for arrest of 
suspected person" or from the Georgia Code !105-1005, which 
is the Georgia shoplifting statute. The law provides, in a 
a.tore situation, that if an employee reasonably thinks a 
customer is shoplifting, and if the customer has behaved in 
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such a manner as to cause a man of reasonable prudence to 
believe that he was shoplifting, and if the time and manner 
of detention or arrest of the customer are reasonable, the 
customer may not recover damages against the store or the 
employee for detention. This constitutes a defense to a 
false arrest or malicious prosecution action and is what is 
called a "qualified privilege" based on probable cause. 
To illustrate, recall Groucho Marx and his prank 
with the phony diamonds. Under common law rules, if he were 
detained and searched and no store property found on him, 
he technically would have a right of action for false arrest. 
Once a mistake is made, it does not matter how much probable 
cause the storekeeper had: if he is wrong, he is liable. 
The "reasonable cause" legislation reverses this situation 
and is illustrated nicely in the Georgia case of S. S. Kresge 
Co. v. Carty [120 Ga. App. 170]. Our shoplifting law makes 
it illegal not only to steal merchandise, but to steal or 
alter labels. A woman and her husband walked into a K-Mart 
store and spent a lot of time in the picture frame depart-
ment. A clerk saw her put into her pocketbook a yellow roll 
of something which looked to him like the rolls of price tags 
used by the store in that department. The store had been 
having trouble with people switching labels on merchandise, 
so the clerk followed Mrs. Carty out to the sidewalk and 
asked her whether she did not have a roll of price tags in 
her pocketbook. The yellow roll turned out to be not a roll 
of price tags but a yellow tape measure she· had brought along 
for use in selecting a picture frame. She alleged that she 
was forced to go back into the store and allow a search of 
her bag, and suffered great humiliation and so on. Under 
the former rule, the store would have been liable for damages. 
With the shoplifting statute, the court held that "it is the 
public policy of this state that there be no recovery" where 
the person's behavior reasonably caused an employee to believe 
the person was shoplifting. It added: "It is when the jury 
may conclude that an honest mistake was made and that the 
merchant had reasonable cause to believe that one was shop-
lifting that the defense is available." 
Custodians of valuable property, such as archives 
and records, need this same protection. It covers you for 
what you do personally and what you cause a police officer 
to do in the way of arrest or search if it finally turns 
out that a mistake was made. 
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Even with this protection, however, I must warn 
you that stores generally caution their staffs to be very 
careful in what they do or say. Rich's, as I have said, 
adopts the basic slogan for its security people: "If you 
didn't see it, it didn't happen." And while Rich's and some 
other stores now use on all the higher priced merchandise 
the electronic markers which set off an alarm if not reDX>ved, 
the employees are trained never to make accusations. Instead, 
they apologize to the customer, blame the presence of the 
activator on the probable negligence of a sales clerk in 
forgetting to remove it after making a sale, and point out 
that of course the customer does not want to wear the item 
with the activator on because it would set off alarms in 
other stores. In this way, according to Rich's head of se-
curity, they frequently reassure the customer sufficiently 
to get her to open her shopping bag or whatever. The employees 
also may suggest that they be shown the sales slip in order to 
reprimand the clerk, and by this means recover a considerable 
amount of stolen goods by allowing the customer to save face 
and pretend that the item got into the shopping bag simply by 
accident. But in these instances, so far as I know, they do 
not make a case against the shoplifter. 
This brings me to a third possible piece of legis-
lation. As I said, any detention, any interference with the 
right of another person to come and go as he sees fit, is an 
arrest. And arrests without warrants for arrest, like searches 
without a valid arrest or a search warrant, are presumptively 
illegal. The burden is always on the person making the arrest 
or search to convince a jury that he had probable cause, that 
he acted under the circumstances as a reasonable person would 
be expected to do. The really blanket exception to these rules 
is the search by consent. One who consents to the opening of 
his briefcase or pocketbook cannot complain. This is the pre-
mise on which the airlines operate in requiring you and. your 
hand luggage to go through electronic surveillance. The under-
lying theory is that nobody -is forcing you to go into the 
protected area, but if you want to do so you must consent to 
certain actions which otherwise would be an invasion of your 
privacy. The reason for this curtailment of your rights lies 
in public necessity. It is a protection to the public and 
crews who fly on airplanes against the illegal acts of· the 
hijacker, the mentally disturbed person with a bomb, and so 
on. Its purpose is to promote the public welfare. 
Archivists and librarians who have in their care 
articles of great value are in a special situation, because 
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what you are protecting is a unique and irreplaceable cul-
tural heritage. I should like, therefore, to see archives, 
museums and libraries protected by a Consent to Search law, 
which would imply the consent to search clothing or personal 
effects from presence in the area. The visitor must know 
that he is giving up a part of his right to privacy before 
he enters; the choice is then his, as it is the airline pas-
senger's, whether or not to use the facility. 
An act could state: 
Any Depository may place within its entrance-
way a sign substantially as follows: YOUR PRES-
ENCE HERE CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF 
ALL CLOTHING AND PERSONAL EFFECTS BROUGHT ON THESE 
PREMISES. The custodian or authorized agent of 
a Depository displaying such notice may detain and 
question any person whose conduct causes reasonable 
grounds for suspicion that such person is engaging, 
or is about to engage, in theft of, or criminal 
damage or trespass to, Depository property. The 
employee or agent also may search the clothing and 
personal effects of the suspect. Visitors will be 
deemed to have consented to reasonable detention 
and search, and no action for false arrest, false 
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution may be pred-
icated on .such action. 
Not every library or archives will want to post 
such a sign because of the public relations problem it might 
engender. For those used primarily by bona fide researchers 
and serious visitors and students, it should be very helpful. 
Even with the probable aause and reasonable man legislation, 
cases may occur that must be suffered through trial and jury 
verdict because of wide differences in testimony. I think 
this is what makes storekeepers hesitate, even when they 
are sure that the taking was a theft. Instead, they are 
satisfied if they get back the merchandise, or even part 
of it. Merchandise is replaceable; manuscripts are not. 
I would make one final comment on the words used. 
In Georgia, "theft" encompasses every taking with the intent 
to deprive the owner of the property. Defacement or damage 
to books is covered by the criminal damage statute (Code S26-
1502) if the damage exceeds $100, or the criminal trespass 
statute (Code §26-1503(a)) if the damage is less than $100 
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or if there is willful interference with the possession or 
use of the property not amounting to theft. The word "prop-
erty" in the criminal code means either real or personal 
property. 
The three changes in the law which I am suggest-
ing would apply whether the property involved was a broken 
window, a defaced wall, a desk or typewriter, a document, 
or work of art. They would apply also whether or not the 
person suspected is a user or an employee. These three 
areas--broadening the permissible "arrest" area for peace 
officers, activating a probable cause defense, and establish-
ing a consent to search rule where appropriate--would give 
archivists, librarians, and museum curators maximum protection. 
You need this protection, for you are the guardians of our 
cultural heritage. And only as we have an opportunity to 
know and venerate the past can we meaningfully inform the 
future. 
NOTE 
1 James B. Rhoads, "Alienation and Thievery: 
Archival Problems," American Archivist, 29 (April, 1966), 
207. 
[Action aimed at securing appropriate legisla-
tion to protect Georgia's archivists in defending the re-
sources ' entrusted to them does not stop here. See ARCHIVE 
NOTES, pps. 73-83, below.--Ed.] 
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